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Recommendation   
Our Airbus Group (AIR:PA) buy recommendation derives mostly from strong 
backlog performance in 2016 with above industry average revenue growth rate 
expectations and better than expected management execution risks. While 
reported Q3 ’16 results were less than expected, delivery rates and deals closed 
increased again towards the end of the year, leading the market with a very 
positive tendency for 2017. The current target price is set at EUR 64.54, 
resulting into an expected return over a period of 12 months of 16.6%. Airbus 
restructuring announcement further strengthened the management’s proactive 
steps towards a concentration on its well performing core business: 
commercial aircraft manufacturing.   
Positive  
 Commercial Aerospace markets see a strong upward trend due to 
increasing passenger numbers and number of newly arising aviation mega 
cities for next decade, especially in markets with high GDP and population 
growth, such as Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East. Airbus 
is expected to capture growth in terms of sales of new aircraft and 
replacements, leaving the market at a current 50-50 weight.  
 Helicopters business shows stable revenues and market leadership in the 
commercial helicopters segment is preserved for the FY 2016. 
 Airbus closes an historic aircraft order contract end of 2016 with Iranian 
Air after receiving necessary export permissions from US export agency. 
The order encompasses 100 new aircrafts with 46 single-aisle aircrafts. 
Together with strong backlog value, 2016 prepares Airbus for a strong 
2017.  
Negative 
 This year Airbus faced increased execution risks due to longer backlog 
periods and operational problems to finalize the new engine option program 
for the A320 family of Airbus Commercial Aerospace. Coupled with 
decision to cut the A380 lossmaking program, high penalty payments for 
the long-term delivery delay of the A400M, and construction issues for the 
A350 XWB, the pressure on Airbus rises to avoid similar challenges in the 
future and to increase build rates.   
 Low oil prices, the increasing dollar appreciation, and low financing costs 
render airline financing as a high risk for Airbus, especially considering the 
historically high backlog value and average backlog length. As soon as 
prices increase more and financing becomes more expensive, Airbus could 
face a strong cancellation wave.  
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The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive business and financial 
analysis of Airbus Group and deliver an investment recommendation based on 
the current price and the expected return for the period of the next 12 months. 
The expected upside is 16.6% for the 12 next months’ period. In order to derive 
the target price of the business, we applied a sum-of-the-parts DCF valuation 
for the two parts we defined: Airbus Commercial Aerospace/HQ, and Defence 
& Space combined with the Helicopters business unit. The valuation results 
were confirmed by a multiple based valuation. Overall, we observed the 
potential for positive growth for all three business units, in particular, for the 
revenue driving Airbus Commercial Aerospace. 
Airbus Commercial Aerospace was determined as the main revenue 
contributor within the Group by currently contributing more than 70% to total 
revenues. Despite the challenges associated with an appreciating dollar, low 
interest rates and fluctuating oil prices, we follow the market dynamics and 
forecast very attractive revenue growth for the next 5 years. We strongly 
believe that Airbus is taking the right steps towards eliminating execution risks 
and towards slowly increasing build rates and operating margins to decrease 
high average backlog periods. CA has excellent market opportunities in the 
Middle East, Asia Pacific and Latin America, were welfare increases and air 
traffic demand grows. Given Airbus’ leading market position in aircraft 
manufacturing, we expect Airbus to outperform the Aerospace & Defence 
industry in the coming years.  
Airbus Defence & Space saw some major hiccups this year caused by A400M 
delivery delays that the company has been dragging along for several years. 
We observed how D&S revenues decreased this year due to significant penalty 
payments to Germany. This weakened the business for the A400M once more. 
The remaining business demonstrated positive trends and could grow. We 
expect D&S sales to stagnate more in the future, partly due to the fierce 
competition and competitive advantages of US companies within that business. 
Airbus Helicopters shows stable, yet low growth but retains its market 
leadership in the commercial helicopter business. The general outlook is more 
conservative motivated by decreasing order intakes.          
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in EUR mn 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F CAGR
Sales 60,713 64,450 65,682 69,662 73,968 5.1%
EBITDA (adj) 5,999 6,487 5,569 6,076 6,409 1.7%
EBIT 3,849 4,021 3,625 4,016 4,225 2.4%
Net income (adj) 2,208 2,534 2,111 2,256 2,415 2.3%
EPS (adj) (in EUR) 2.82 3.23 2.73 2.89 3.08 2.3%
Diluted shares (mn) 784.3 783.9 772.7 781.5 783.5 0.0%
Margins and returns 
in % 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F Avg
Sales growth 5.5% 6.2% 2.0% 6.1% 6.2% 5.2%
EBITDA margin 9.8% 9.7% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 9.1%
EBIT margin 6.3% 6.2% 5.5% 5.8% 5.7% 5.9%
ROIC 15.9% 15.1% 10.3% 9.9% 9.6% 12%
ROA 2.4% 2.5% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2%
ROE 23.8% 35.7% 37.1% 33.8% 30.4% 32%
ROCE 7.9% 7.6% 6.4% 7.1% 7.1% 7%
Balance sheet and cash flows
in EUR mn 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F CAGR
Tangible fixed assets 16,388 17,193 18,154 19,172 20,136 5.3%
Intangible fixed assets 12,758 12,555 12,555 12,555 12,555 -0.4%
Cash & cash equivalents 7,271 6,590 4,950 3,337 6,892 -1.3%
Short & long-term debt 7,351 9,125 11,319 11,319 11,319 11.4%
Operating ratios 
in % 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F Avg
FCF/NI 2.55 1.58 0.35 0.20 2.34 1.40
R&D/Sales 5.6% 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%
Capex/Sales 4.2% 4.5% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 4.4%
D&A/sales 3.5% 3.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2%




Airbus Group Company Overview 
Airbus is a multinational company that operates globally in the Aerospace & Defence (A&D) 
market. Airbus Group encompasses three major business units, Airbus Commercial Aerospace 
(CA), Airbus Helicopters and Defence & Space (D&S). In 2015, the Group generated annual 
revenues of EUR 64,5bn (2014: EUR 60,7bn), showing a compounded annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 4% since 2012. From its three divisions, Airbus CA remains the leading revenue 
driver contributing to 70% to annual Group revenues with an increasing trend, followed by 
D&S services that currently generate around 20% of revenues and Helicopters generating the 
final 10%. Formerly named EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), 
Airbus Group changed its name in 2013 to better reflect the importance and historical strength 
of the CA division (named Airbus) within the company. Airbus CA aircraft product portfolio 
currently encompasses three commercial aircraft families (A320, A330, and A340), the newest 
aircraft A350XWB, and the jumbo jet A380, as well as one freighter aircraft model. The aircraft 








In October 2016, Airbus Group announced a major restructuring plan which will merge the 
company’s headquarters with the Airbus Commercial Aircraft unit in order to lever efficiencies 
after encountering difficulties in maintaining and improving operating margins at Airbus. We 
regard this as a positive change for Airbus, helping the Group to refocus on its growing core 
business, commercial aircraft manufacturing, and increase cost efficiencies and profitability 
which suffered heavily since 2015. The latter was mostly due to major failure of the jumbo jet 
A380. Restructuring changes have already been accounted for in the valuation model by 
considering Airbus CA and the headquarters as one part in the the sum-of-the-parts valuation. 
While in terms of backlog and sales the Commercial Aerospace industry is dominated by 
Boeing (market leader) and Airbus, its other business units D&S as well as Helicopters operate 
in a denser and more competitive landscape, competing against market giants such as Textron 
and Lockheed Martin, but also Boeing. It is noteworthy, that Airbus was originally founded as 
Income Statement in m EUR 2012a 2013a 2014a 2015a 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f
Revenues 56,480 57,567 60,713 64,450 65,682 69,662 73,968 78,423 83,167
YoY % growth 15.0% 1.9% 5.5% 6.2% 2.0% 6.1% 6.2% 6.0% 6.0%
Airbus 36,999 38,561 41,531 45,090 47,345 50,659 54,205 57,999 62,059
% of revenues 65.5% 67.0% 68.4% 70.0% 72.1% 72.7% 73.3% 74.0% 74.6%
Airbus Helicopters 5,724 5,811 5,996 6,153 6,215 6,277 6,528 6,789 7,060
% of revenues 10.1% 10.1% 9.9% 9.5% 9.5% 9.0% 8.8% 8.7% 8.5%
Airbus Defence & Space 13,154 12,739 12,728 12,917 11,833 12,425 12,922 13,309 13,709
% of revenues 23.3% 22.1% 21.0% 20.0% 18.0% 17.8% 17.5% 17.0% 16.5%
Other / HQ / Consolidated 603 456 458 290 290 302 314 326 339
% of revenues 1.1% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Table 2 – Revenue split and year-on-year growth of three major business units 
Source: Airbus company data, Analyst research & assumptions 
 




European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS), a consortium of several European aerospace 
companies, with the objective of competing against strong US competitors such as Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin in all branches of the aerospace and defence industry. The battle was clearly 
won from a commercial aerospace perspective, since Airbus established itself as the real 
European counterpart to the traditional market leader Boeing. The remainders of the former 
EADS construct can be recognized in today’s shareholding structure, where the French, 
German and Spanish government form a blocking minority with a combined share of 26.4% of 
the company (see Recommendation). 
Despite market entry of Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs, explained below), Airbus 
is expected to maintain a leading market position for at least the next 10 years. However, we 
saw D&S revenues declining again this year contributing to only 18% of the increased revenues, 
compared to a more than 23% share in 2012. This negative trend is also reflected in the forecast 
of the D&S division, which result in a CAGR of only 1% from 2012 to 2020.  
The Helicopters business seems more stable and shows steady, yet low growth rates at only 1% 
for the financial year 2016 (vs. 2.6% in 2015). In comparison, D&S is expected to experience 
a true revenue dip until end of 2016, mostly due to delicate A400M delivery delay issues and 
penalty payments thereof.   
Airbus Group operates and sells 
aircrafts globally on all continents. 
Europe and North America are still 
the strongest markets for Airbus in 
terms of percentage of revenue 
contribution. Nonetheless, both 
geographical areas have been in 
decline in terms of revenues this year. 
In case of Europe the growth rate has 
even been negative since 2013 and is 
expected to follow this trend to a certain extend during the forecasting period (until 2020). In 
accordance to what the market tells us in the form of new contracts formed, we observe strong 
revenue growth in Asia, Middle East and Latin America. The increase comes from a positive 
trend in sales numbers of Airbus CA to Middle Eastern and Asian airlines companies, that 
heavily invest in fleet expansion and attract and retain customers by offering mostly long-
distance, high quality aircraft flights.   
Geographic revenue split 2012a 2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F
Europe 21,006 20,724 20,254 20,060 19,705
% of revenues 37.2% 36.0% 33.4% 31.1% 30.0%
% yoy growth -1.3% -2.3% -1.0% -1.8%
Asia-Pacific 18,344 18,997 19,379 18,755 19,705
% of revenues 32.5% 33.0% 31.9% 29.1% 30.0%
% yoy growth 3.6% 2.0% -3.2% 5.1%
North America 7,681 8,635 9,731 10,217 9,524
% of revenues 13.6% 15.0% 16.0% 15.9% 14.5%
% yoy growth 12.4% 12.7% 5.0% -6.8%
Middle East 5,413 5,181 6,520 8,612 9,852
% of revenues 9.6% 9.0% 10.7% 13.4% 15.0%
% yoy growth -4.3% 25.8% 32.1% 14.4%
Latin America 3,540 4,030 3,844 4,096 4,598
% of revenues 6.3% 7.0% 6.3% 6.4% 7.0%
% yoy growth 13.8% -4.6% 6.6% 12.2%
Other countries 496 882 985 2,710 2,299
% of revenues 0.9% 1.5% 1.6% 4.2% 3.5%
% yoy growth 77.8% 11.7% 175.1% -15.2%
Table 3 – Geographic revenue split at Airbus Group, 2012 to 2016 
Source: Airbus company data, Statista, Analyst assumptions 
 




For 2016, the yearly backlog battle between Boeing and Airbus seems to have been won by 
Boeing, but the outlook is in favour of Airbus in 2017, due to the expected resolution of many 
manufacturing execution problems, facilitating more deliveries in the coming year. 
Nonetheless, the delivery targets for commercial aircrafts have not been met for all aircraft 
families/types. Airbus Group recently announced the increase of the annual delivery target from 
650 aircraft to 670 aircrafts for 2017 onwards. This is supposed to send a positive signal to 
investors and stakeholders, that the 
company expects to increase production 
efficiencies after some important 
production and delivery delays, mostly in 
the A350 XWB program and in the 
provision of the new engine option (neo) 
upgrade for the A320 family, which had 
caused many customers to convert orders within the A320 family to the current engine option 
(ceo). 
Airbus Group faces increasing competitive landscape in the A&D industry  
The industry of Aerospace and Defence in which Airbus Group operates varies entirely from 
the other two divisions in terms of competitive landscape. Within the A&D industry, Airbus 
additionally faces an increased competitive influence of technology-focused, multinational 
OEMs, such as BAE Systems, Safran, or L-3 Communications.  
The A&D industry competition map (Figure 3) distinguishes between commercial aircraft jet 
manufacturers for passenger and freight transport 
(commercial aerospace) and defence and space 
technologies, services and aircraft manufacturers 
(encompassing helicopters for commercial and defence 
use). Figure 2 shows the explained market split with 
leading listed European and other global market leaders. 
Generally speaking, the US market is financially the most 
active and risk-prone market. Therefore, US companies 
tend to outperform European competitors on a pure 
multiple basis and in terms of market value. This is also 







































Figure 2 – Global leading A&D 
manufacturers 2015 by sales in USD mn, 














2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Order books Airbus vs. Boeing
Total Gross Orders Cancellations AIR Total Gross Orders Cancellations BOE
Figure 1- Airbus vs. Boeing backlog (order) battle development, 
2011-2016, Sources: Boeing, Airbus, Statista 




index benchmark to derive market riskiness based unlevered betas for Airbus, reflecting lower 
market returns for the European market (see Appendix 5).       
On both global and European level, we observe a trend towards OEMs disrupting the current 
market structure and gaining an increased market share, in particular in the commercial 
aerospace business. On European level, Airbus competes against a variety of OEMs from 
France, the UK and Germany that are operating as components and engines manufacturers as 
well as technology providers in both fields, commercial aircraft manufacturing and space & 










Historically, The Boeing Company (Boeing) and Airbus have formed a strong duopoly position 
in the commercial aircraft manufacturing market. Only in the last years, this duopolistic market 
position began to break with OEMs obtaining direct market share. Especially Bombardier 
(CAN), The Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Ltd. (Comac, CN), and United Aircraft 








The latter puts pressure on both Airbus and Boeing to fast forward production rates, decrease 
inefficiencies and delays, but also to be aware of the importance of technological advances and 





Figure 4 – Global backlog breakdown development by OEM, 2004 vs. 2015, 
Sources: Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Flightglobal, 2016 
COMMERCIAL AEROSPACE SPACE & DEFENSE / HELICOPTERS
European Global European Global
Airbus Com.Air. Boeing Rolls Royce Boeing
GKN Embraer BAE Systems Lockheed Martin
Meggitt United Aircraft Corp Airbus Helicopter / S&D Textron
MTU Friedrichshafen Comac Leonardo-Finmeccanica Raytheon
Zodiac Aerospace Bombardier Meggitt Northrop Grumman
Safran Cobham Plc General Dynamics
Thales Thales
Figure 3 – Overview European and Main Global Competitors of Airbus Operating Business, 
Sources: Own research, Statista, Airbus  




integration proved to be a hot topic during the Farnborough Airshow1 in July this year, where 
new systems and applications were presented with the objective to make use of the high amount 
of data generated by each aircraft in use and finally, convert this data into useful information 
that can help improve aircraft operations for airlines and manufacturers.       
 
Drivers and trends of Airbus’ commercial aerospace business 
Airbus Group is the world`s second largest manufacturer and seller of commercial aircraft in 
terms of backlog and annual sales right behind the US American Boeing Company. Within the 
Aerospace and Defence market, Airbus holds a solid position and competes against industry 
giants General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and Textron.   
Key drivers for Airbus value creation and the industry 
As in every business sector, the aerospace and defence industries entail some key value drivers 
which drive success and failure. Especially in terms of valuation and ratio analysis, these key 
value drivers play a major role. While asset-light businesses, such as technology companies and 
services companies, potentially face higher margins and are more agile given the higher 
flexibility in their business model, asset-heavy industries, such as Airbus’ aerospace and 
defence industry, need to be looked at from a different perspective. Especially the backlog 
analysis is a milestone for the success of each company within these industries.  
Another key value driver for Airbus’ commercial aerospace business is the revenue per 
passenger kilometre (RPK), which measures air traffic revenue performance. International 
airline companies are Airbus main customers and derive most of their own business value from 
this key value driver. The ratio also enables companies and analysts to track air traffic growth. 
RPK is calculated by multiplying the number of revenue-paying passengers of an airline by the 
distance in km that was travelled. While this perimeter of air traffic may not be directly used to 
forecast revenues of aircraft manufacturers such as Airbus Group, it serves as an excellent 
indicator for airline market growth and performance, which eventually and next to other things 
determine Airbus revenues. Figure 6 highlights the strong trend towards increased air passenger 
traffic by comparing the actual increase from 1995 to 2015 with the expected increase until 
                                                 
1 The Annual Farnborough Airshow is the largest international professional and public exhibition and fair of 
leading international industry participants. The Airshow is a highlight for investors and analysts as well, since 
crucial market insights are given and the show’s outcome in terms of order value stipulate an important sign for 
the industry performance expectations. This year orders and upgrades for commercial and military aircraft, engines 
and other components and services were made for as much as USD 124bn (Source: Farnborough Airshow)  




2035. Especially Asia Pacific and Europe will observe a significant increase in RPK in domestic 
air traffic. Unsurprisingly, there is a similar regional representation when looking at the 
worldwide leading airlines ranking by RPK in 2015 (see Figure 5). This list is headed by North 
American, Middle Eastern, European and Asian airline companies. Both Europe and Asia 
Pacific are expected to more than double their RPK until 2035 up to RPK 3.3bn and RPK 6.3bn 
respectively.  
Due to the expected increase in RPK, the growth of the middle class and of the general 
population, as well as the increased amount of aviation mega cities in the Middle East, Europe 
and Asia, the averaged compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 179 passenger air traffic 
flows is high at 5.5% for the period 2015-2025. It is to note that expected year-on-year growth 
rates of Airbus are likely to be higher than the CAGR until 2020, which is why we assume an 
annual overall revenue growth rate of over 6% per annum for those years. The main driver for 
the increased demand in air travel is the welfare growth in Asia Pacific and the Middle East. 
Apart from that only an estimated 6% of the worldwide population took an airplane in 2015, 
leaving room for additional demand once welfare and global connectivity reach higher levels.    
Likewise, air freight traffic is expected to increase 
over the next ten years at a CAGR of 4.8%. 
However, since Airbus only sells one cargo 
freighter, the A330-200 Freighter, at comparably 
high cost (average price per unit in 2016 was USD 
235m), we do not expect Airbus to benefit from 













Figure 7 – Projected aircraft deliveries from 2016 to 2035, 
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Figure 6 – Air passenger traffic from 1995 to 2035, by region 
(in billion RPKs), Source: Statista, 2016 
Figure 5 – List of leading airlines by RPK bn, Source: 
Statista, 2016 




Trends driving the commercial aerospace industry 
The commercial aerospace subsector encompasses passenger air transport as well as air cargo 
transportation. Both business pillars are supposed to double in terms of annual passenger 
number as well as commercial passenger and cargo aircraft fleet. We observe that the 
commercial aerospace market shows some positive growth trends in 2016, which are causing 
high expectations on sales growth and operational earnings growth. This trend is fuelled by 
several aspects, being mostly the commercial airlines’ hunger for innovative, fuel-efficient 
airplanes of the next generation as well as the obvious annual increase in air passenger transport. 
The industry is characterized by high needs for technological and material novelties increasing 
efficiencies and aircraft performance on a constant basis while improving the ecological 
footprint of the environmentally heavy industry. 
According to the Global Market Forecast 2016-2035 study, annually published by Airbus, the 
amount of aviation mega cities, defined as cities with over 10,000 daily long-haul passengers, 
will increase from 55 cities in 2015 to over 78 cities in 2025 and 93 in 2035. These so-called 
mega cities will mostly be located in Asia Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East and will drive 
a big part of the future’s air travel – a trend that can already be observed now with expanding 
high-class airlines from the Middle East and big air travel terminals such as Singapore for 
international travel. Airbus’ order book is reflecting this trend with major Asian and Middle 
Eastern airlines, such as Emirates, being the primary clients for high quality, technologically 
advanced and capable aircraft. At the same time, the global estimated proportion of the middle 
class will increase to up to 55% of the total population in 2035, compared to 38% in 2015. 
Together with increased purchasing power of the middle class, counting as households with an 
annual income between $20,000 and $150,000, travelling for both leisure and business purposes 
will increase. The latter phenomena might also increase air cargo demand through globally 
steered necessity of production components and goods.  
Currently, there is a concern in the commercial aerospace market that OEMs are oversupplying 
the market at between 1% to 2% (equalling approx. 300 aircraft), as build rates and deliverables 
increased significantly during the last 5 years. Experts are afraid that this oversupply with 
exceed demand and unbalance the velocity of deliverables. Even though, both Airbus and 
Boeing levelled up their build rates, they are still dependent on airlines’ demand in fleet 
replacement which grows at lower rates. Now that Airbus announced to cut back wide body 
aircrafts, e.g. A380, build rates are expected to decrease again, in particular, due to slow 
economic growth and low oil prices.   




Airbus’ Space and Defence business 
 
Airbus Defence and Space (D&S) is the second largest business unit of Airbus Group, 
generating average annual revenue of EUR 12,000mn (accounting for slightly over 20% of 
Group revenues). Airbus offers satellites and launcher systems, combat aircraft, missile 
systems, radar, defence electronics, and unmanned aerial systems.  
As was previously explained, the main value driver for demand in solutions and aircraft 
products in the space and defence section is the level of global military spending, as these are 
mostly financed by governments (federal ministries of defence) or specialized agencies and 
institutions such as the CIA. 2016 and 2015 market results for the defence market were strongly 
hit by the major decrease in military spending in the USA, which decreased by -4% since 2006. 
The USA has historically shown to be the country with the highest military spending worldwide 
consequently driving the industries revenues. Through the major cut rates (4% alone equal 
around USD 25bn which need to be compensated for), the defence industries performance 
observed a major hiccup. Together with the decline in Western and Central European military 
spending, the defence industry faces challenges. Revenues of major defence market participants 
were driven by emerging countries and their governments, such as the Middle East (Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Israel), North Africa (148% increase in military spending since 2016), Central 
Europe as well as Central America and Asia Pacific. Notably, Airbus Space & Defence sales 
are not comprehensively altered by the US Department of Defence (DoD) spending trends, as 
the DoD does not engage in relevant with business with Airbus Group. In 2016, contract awards 
from the DoD went to market leaders Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics and BAE 
Systems. The envisaged upgrade of Boeing and BAE Systems warning and survivability 
systems, worth USD 4bn, is currently threatened by the President-Elect Donald Trump 
expressed intentions to cut the program, as he considers it being pricey. This is perceived as 
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Figure 9 - The 15 countries with the highest military spending 
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Figure 8 – Change in military spending 2006-2015, 
Source: Statista, 2016 




very negative news after his election fuelled hopes for DoD budget increases after large cut 
rates in the past years. 
Discussed military budgets are strongly influenced by the number of ongoing military missions 
to engage and minimize aggressive conflicts or wars, the level of political instability in a 
country and the level of involvement of countries not forming a direct part in these conflicts. In 
times of wide spread war climate, the demand for defence aircraft and technology is rising.  
Airbus Space and Defence is less influenced by US movements as main customers are European 
with the German government currently being the leading customer. Ever since the official split 
from aerospace electronic systems provider BAE Systems in 2006 (used to be 20% minority 
stakeholder in EADS), it is also important to notice the rising competition between the two 
companies through higher bargaining power on BAE’s end and increasing prices for electronic 
systems.  
In the beginning of this year, we observed yet more unsatisfying news regarding the A400M 
airlifter. The airlifter has been designed for tactical, long-distance military and humanitarian 
logistics missions, specifically ordered by the European NATO countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxemburg, Spain, Turkey and the UK) and Malaysia in 2005. Demand was 
consequently strong with European governments and currently the order book entails 174 
aircrafts, but only 34 have been delivered so far. Due to several technical and organizational 
reasons, the program is years behind its delivery schedule. Especially Germany, the largest 
customer for the A400M, has been waiting extendedly for delivery and claimed for damages 
exceeding EUR12.7m this summer, due to deliveries that should have been placed earlier this 
year and in the coming years. Out of the 17 aircrafts the state of Germany should have received 
by now, only seven were delivered. Due to the technical development challenges, costs 
increased significantly and prices rose from initially EUR 153m to EUR 181m per airlifter. We 
expect that D&S will remain strong as a segment. However, large orders for military aircraft 
and systems are more likely to be retained by larger US and, for instance, Russian competitors 
were the overall demand is expected to increase due to political changes and increased 
willingness to interfere in the global instability caused by wars and other conflicts.       
 
Airbus Helicopter business 
Airbus Helicopters shows to be stabilizing and was able to marginally grow again in terms 
revenues also driven by a drop in oil and gas prices. Overall deliveries continue to fall compared 
to the last years. From 503 deliveries in 2011 it gradually decreased the annual number of 




deliveries. Helicopters revenues continue to be split 50-50 between its civil and military 
helicopters, of which 55% stem from European and Middle Eastern countries, 25% from Asia 
Pacific and 20% from North and South America. Airbus Helicopters continues to be world 
market leader in the civil market with 45% of market share. It faces more challenges in the 
military market where it competes against a variety of companies in a larger overall market (see 
Figure 11). For the valuation of Airbus, it was also therefore chosen to value it as one part 
together with Airbus D&S, since both business 











Macroeconomic trends and model imperatives 
The market for commercial aircraft is highly driven by oil price developments and financing 
cost trends. Airlines constantly seek for a trade-off between decent financing costs and 
operational costs. Commercial aircrafts are expensive and airlines tend to order them in bulks, 
hence exposing them as a business to huge financing (and operational) risks. In a somewhat 
sustainable low interest rate environment, as it was the case for the last years, buying new 
aircrafts is much more attractive for airlines, as they assume that financing quotes will stay as 
low as they were 2 or 3 years ago. This is one reason why backlog has increased so significantly, 
Figure 13 – Worldwide air traffic passenger revenue 
from 2004 to 016 in USD bn, Source: Statista 
Figure 12 - Backlog development at Airbus from 1998 to 2015, 











































Figure 10 – Deliveries developments by helicopter type, 
Source: Airbus Helicopters, Analyst research 
Figure 11 – 2015 market share Airbus Helicopters in 
civil and military market, Source: Airbus Helicopters 




especially between 2008 and now, filling order books of Airbus and Boeing up to almost 
unsustainable levels (see Figure 13). Simultaneously, fuel prices rocketed since the financial 
crisis hit the global markets in 2008. This led to huge operating losses in the books of 
international airlines which led airlines to exploit the cheap financing situation even more, to 
quickly buy more modern and fuel efficient aircrafts that will compensate for the pressure on 
prices and operating margins. As soon as the oil prices dropped again from 2015 until now, 
airlines became even more incentivized to buy aircraft cheaply now, bringing order backlog of 
Airbus and Boeing to where they are today. As Figure 16 shows, while oil crude prices may be 
sustainable at low levels, this will fuel air traffic growth even more and increase demand for jet 
kerosene products. Beyond that, these movements justify the current ratio of 60-40 between 
new aircraft order and replacement aircraft orders. 
Industry voices raise their concern that the order books that were filled under these low interest 
rate conditions will not be sustainable due to the buying motives explained before. However, 
we now observe that financing costs are slowly rising - the Federal Reserve raised the policy 
rates by 0.25% after a long time of historical lows. Higher financing costs will alter airlines’ 
decisions in buying new aircraft and replacing old ones and might lead to high order 
cancellation ratios within the next years.   
Another trend that afflicts the A&D industry is the continuing appreciation of the dollar which 
is tried to be eased by slowly increasing borrowing rates in the US. Since all major aircraft 
manufacturers and OEMs state their prices in dollars to provide globally levelled and 
comparable playing field, especially companies outside the United States suffer from price 
increase due to currency appreciation. Only from 2013 to 2015 average prices published in the 
annual Airbus aircraft price list increased by 7%. This will continue to have an impact on future 
prices that Airbus sets and will potentially also increase manufacturing costs, as OEMs will be 
forced to increase their prices accordingly, especially those located in emerging markets where 






















































































































Figure 15 – Comparison global GDP growth and airline 
traffic growth (in RPK), Source:Statista, Airbus, 
Flightglobal, Analyst assumptions 
 12M RPK growth 
GDP growth 
Figure 16 – Crude oil prices per barrel and moving average 
between 1980 and 2015, Source: Statista 




period is strongly increasing and momentarily peaks at 9 years (compared to normal backlog 
periods of between 2 to 5 years). These seven years in Airbus’ order books do not account for 
major delays in production demonstrating more inherit exchange rate and financing risks that 
Airbus as a manufacturer, but also airlines as clients and the industry suppliers suffer from. We 
just observed these dynamics this year in the many up and downgrades within the A320 family 
engine option upgrade context. 
Airlines historically financed new aircrafts through either loans or leases (operating or 
financing). Lately, leasing has become an even more attractive financing option and currently 
leasing agencies hold over 21% of the total backlog value and continue to grow. Given that the 
backlog value has increased so significantly to over USD 2.5 trillion, the assessment of 
financing vulnerability of airlines and leasing agencies has become increasingly important. 
Judging only by the credit rating of airlines costumers (limited to those rated by agencies), 
around 12% of the total backlog value, equalling USD 225bn, is based on orders by airlines 
with extremely low creditworthiness (rating off BB or lower). Consequently, airline financing 
which is influenced by overall access to low interest rates loans and leasing agreements, and 
strongly exposed to changes in exchange rates, oil prices and policy interest rates, is one of the 
high risks of the entire commercial aircraft manufacturing industry.  
 
Valuation 
Airbus Group was valued using two different valuation methods: the discounted cash flow 
(DCF) valuation, based on a sum of the parts valuation, and the multiples-based, market-
oriented valuation approach. Both valuation models provide appropriate valuations that already 
price in the many high risks, mainly caused by execution uncertainty, exchange rate 
fluctuations, oil price fluctuations and the general dynamics of cyclical businesses. While a 
DCF valuation will always end up providing a lower valuation than market-driven multiples-
based valuations, we consider the DCF method the most appropriate method for the business 
of Airbus Group in order to capture all movements in its heavy balance sheet correctly, through 
adequate and company adjusted forecasts.  
Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Since on average 70% of total Group revenues are generated by Airbus CA, the business unit 
was valued separately from the rest of the Group (see Table 4). Additionally, the company 
announced a restructuring this years which will merge the CA business with the headquarters 
(HQ), which supports the argument that the CA division is the most important value driver for 




the Group. Consequently, we used a sum-of the-parts approach for the DCF valuation. While 
Airbus CA and HQ were considered to be one “part”, the Airbus business units D&S and Airbus 
Helicopters were considered the second “part”. As was explained beforehand, both units 
compete against very similar market competitors, may face a similar market environment and 
have similar key value drivers. At the same time, Airbus Helicopters contributes only c. 10% 
to total revenues and lacks adequate comparables in terms of business model and size, and 
finally, Airbus Group annual reports provide only little information on both divisions, 
Helicopters and S&D. Within the revenue forecast model, it is assumed that both divisions will 
decrease their contribution to total Group sales to 25%. This is mostly due to a lower CAGR 
(1% between 2015 and 2020) in the Aerospace and Defence sector, slowing down the business 
and its revenue contribution to 16.5% in 2020. 
Airbus Helicopters is expected to contribute slightly to total revenues in the future (9.5% in 
2015 to 8.5% in 2020) but shows a stable CAGR of 3%. The main driver of future revenue 
growth of the Group is the overperforming Airbus Commercial Aerospace division which is 
expected to outperform RPK growth (worldwide CAGR c.5.5%) and demand growth until 2020 
with a CAGR of 7% (CAGR 2012 to 2015 was 7%). This expected outperformance is based on 
the still predominant industry position, especially in terms of backlog (see Appendix8), as well 
Income Statement in EUR mn 2012A 2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
Revenues 56,480 57,567 60,713 64,450 65,682 69,662 73,968 78,423 83,167
YoY % growth 15.0% 1.9% 5.5% 6.2% 2.0% 6.1% 6.2% 6.0% 6.0%
Airbus 36,999 38,561 41,531 45,090 47,345 50,659 54,205 57,999 62,059
% of revenues 65.5% 67.0% 68.4% 70.0% 72.1% 72.7% 73.3% 74.0% 74.6%
Airbus Helicopters 5,724 5,811 5,996 6,153 6,215 6,277 6,528 6,789 7,060
% of revenues 10.1% 10.1% 9.9% 9.5% 9.5% 9.0% 8.8% 8.7% 8.5%
Airbus Defence & Space 13,154 12,739 12,728 12,917 11,833 12,425 12,922 13,309 13,709
% of revenues 23.3% 22.1% 21.0% 20.0% 18.0% 17.8% 17.5% 17.0% 16.5%
Other / HQ / Consolidated 603 456 458 290 290 302 314 326 339
% of revenues 1.1% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Costs of Goods Sold (48,582) (49,613) (51,776) (55,599) (56,487) (59,700) (63,390) (67,209) (71,274)
% of revenues 86.0% 86.2% 85.3% 86.3% 86.0% 85.7% 85.7% 85.7% 85.7%
Gross Margin 7,898 7,954 8,937 8,851 9,195 9,962 10,577 11,215 11,893
% of revenues 14.0% 13.8% 14.7% 13.7% 14.0% 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 14.3%
Operating expenses (6,029) (5,880) (5,992) (6,111) (6,203) (6,579) (6,985) (7,406) (7,854)
% of revenues 3.0% 2.8% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
R&D expenses (3,160) (3,118) (3,391) (3,460) (3,607) (3,825) (4,062) (4,306) (4,567)
% of revenues 5.6% 5.4% 5.6% 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%
Share invest. profits under equity method 241 434 840 1,016 633 633 633 633 633
Reported EBITDA 4,163 4,435 5,935 6,222 5,569 6,076 6,409 6,800 7,243
EBITDA margin 7.4% 7.7% 9.8% 9.7% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7%
One-off transactions 376 558 64 265 0 0 0 0 0
Normalized EBITDA 4,539 4,993 5,999 6,487 5,569 6,076 6,409 6,800 7,243
EBITDA margin adj. 8.0% 8.7% 9.9% 10.1% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7%
Depreciation 2,053 1,927 2,150 2,466 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
EBIT 2,486 3,066 3,849 4,021 3,625 4,016 4,225 4,441 4,672
% of revenues 4.4% 5.3% 6.3% 6.2% 5.5% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.6%
Interest income 237 161 142 183 142 107 107 107 107
Interest expense (522) (493) (462) (551) (684) (848) (848) (848) (848)
Other financial result (168) (278) (458) (319) (306) (306) (306) (306) (306)
EBT 2,033 2,456 3,071 3,334 2,778 2,968 3,177 3,394 3,624
Income taxes (438) (477) (863) (800) (667) (712) (763) (814) (870)
Net income 1,595 1,979 2,208 2,534 2,111 2,256 2,415 2,579 2,754
Equity owners of the parent 1,197 1,473 2,343 2,696 2,113 2,258 2,417 2,581 2,756
Non-controlling interests 1 10 7 2 2 2 2 2 2Table 4 – Income statement with revenue division breakdown, Source: Airbus Group Annual 
reports 2012 to 2016, Source: Airbus company filings, Analyst assumptions 




as its increased backlog volume causing high amounts of revenues for the next five years when 
deliveries take place. For 2016 we accounted for a small drop in YoY growth rates to only 2% 
which was caused by operational issues in the A350 XWB program, the “ceo” to “neo” upgrade 
failures within the A320 family as well as the operational issues arising from A400M delays 
and penalty payments. Based on historic averages, Airbus headquarters will grow at a CAGR 
of 3%, which is lower than the annual growth before but captures relevant value increases from 
consolidations, joint ventures and group activities. 
For the terminal value (TV), we assumed a 2% growth rate in revenues and operating costs, 
which covers the average global inflation rate and GDP growth and reflects a realistic growth 
scenario for a mature company like Airbus. 
The underlying business model of Airbus is built on the sale of highly complex products that 
are large in size, consistent of uncountable heavy components, lengthy manufacturing processes 
and finally, high in price. The entire A&D industry, especially the parts of it concentrating on 
aircraft manufacturing, derives its main value from aircraft order backlog value and finally, the 
ability to convert these orders into deliveries in a timely and resource-efficient manner. 
Historically, the industry shows low operating profit margins ranging between 5% and -1% 
during the period of 2004 and 2013. Since 2014 the A&D sector experiences an upward shift 
bringing operating profit margins to as much as 8%, while overall operating profit values are 
increasing.  Airbus is still not able lock-in such levels of operating profit margins due to high 
levels of COGS that amount to approx. 86% of revenues (8-year average since 2012). As only 
minor efficiency-increases are to be expected from the restructuring, for instance through 
employee cut rates and some cost synergies between the HQ and Airbus Commercial 
Aerospace, a decline of 0.3% (equalling EUR 200m savings) in annual COGS to a 85.7% of 
revenues was assumed for the forecasting period. Consequently, gross margin levels off at 
14.3% over the 5-year forecasting period, a margin that is competitive with Boeing’s 
performance. This will cause operating margins to increase slightly up to 5.7% on average for 
the next 5 years. 
Just like in the pharmaceutical industry, aircraft development programs require large amounts 
of upfront research and development (R&D) expenses and other capitalized development costs, 
which are considered operating expenses. In the case of Airbus, R&D costs range between 5% 
and 6% of total revenues every year and value between USD 3.5bn (2015) and USD 4.5bn 
(2020). For the 5-year forecasting period, it was assumed that these costs will be constant at 
annual 5.5% of revenues, since Airbus programs need to spend capital to develop competitive, 
innovative and technologically complex and efficient aircraft products. Even if we assume that 




loss-making programs, e.g. the A380 wide-body aircraft are cut, R&D costs are required at 
constant operational level. These costs are often offset only after years of development, when 
delivery delays already occurred. The latter are mostly due to delays or technical flaws of 
supplier components. The execution risk lies in the challenge of turning pricy aircraft programs 
into actual deliverable aircrafts that have impeccable functionalities and that are delivered in a 
timely manner. Furthermore, these executions risks are influenced by the macroeconomic 
market dynamics, namely increases in oil prices, global GDP level developments and economic 
crises as well as the political environment. This is the reason why Airbus’s business model is 
so dependent on operating working capital and other working capital like items. These 
encompass the typical changes in inventories, trades receivables and payables, but also the 
change in other current assets and liabilities, provisions and most of all advance payments. The 
latter are the main upfront cash inflow that Airbus CA receives and holds as current and non-
current other liabilities. Advance payments are typically determined based on the level of 
completion method, were a customer pays a certain amount every time a certain level of 
manufacturing was completed. To forecast advance payments based on current and non-current 
other liabilities, we computed historical revenue turnovers (as %) and took the historical 
average but only of the last three years as this captures the ratio growth better. From 2016 to 
2018 non-current other liabilities form 21.1% of revenues, and from then on slightly decrease 
to merely 20.4% of revenues, since long-term advance payments should slightly decrease due 
to commercial aircraft market dynamics explained before. Current other liabilities will remain 
constant at 42.3% of revenues for the 5-year forecasting horizon due to expected manufacturing 
efficiencies.  
All other current assets and liabilities, except for the operating working capital items explained 
below, were forecasted by taking their averaged historical revenue turnover (in %) and maintain 
the average level for the forecasting period of 5 years.  
In terms of free cash flow and working capital forecast for the two “parts”, all non-cash other 
items similar to operating working capital were attributed to the Commercial Aerospace 
business unit, as the vast majority of items are a 100% addressable to the aircraft manufacturing 
business unit. The risk profile is also more adequate when allocating these non-cash operating 
working capital items to the Commercial Aerospace/HQ part, as cash flows are discounted at a 
higher WACC.    




Non-current assets that were not property, plant and equipment (PP&E) or strategic investments 
were forecasted based on straight-line projections, hence maintained constant. PP&E was 
forecasted by applying the simple BASE analysis, as can be seen in Table 5. In the balance 
sheet, constant annual investment property value of EUR 66m was added to ending balance 
PP&E. We expect Capital Expenditure (Capex) to growth with sales for the next years. We 
forecasted Capex based on average historical revenue turnover of each division until 2018 
(Airbus Commercial Aerospace already decreases turnover by 0.2% in 2018), and projected 
Capex straight-line after that. Depreciation and Amortization grow initially at the same rate as 
Capex, and were then set to grow faster at 6%, 8% and 9% for 2018 to 2020 respectively. This 
change was modelled to imitate a more natural development of Airbus in terms of Capex and 
D&A, which will eventually equal one another in a mature and established company that does  
not invest more than it depreciates and amortizes in the long-term every year. For the terminal 
value projections, we assumed that depreciation grows by 2% in perpetuity and that Capex is 
102% of the depreciation in the TV to spend slightly more than what is amortized and 
depreciated.  
Airbus Group does not state the precise split of operating working capital (inventories, trade 
receivables, and trade payables) between the three business units, hence assumptions on how 
to split them adequately were made on basis of the general business model propositions and 
information provided on in-year changes in the financial statements (see Table 6). Group 
inventories, payables and receivables were forecasted on basis of averaged historic ratios of 
revenues, which were then used as a constant revenue turnover ratios for the 5-year forecasting 
period. Through the storage and acquisition of huge components, engines and technological 
Depreciation and amortization 2,053 1,927 2,150 2,466 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
D&A as % Capex 62.8% 66.0% 84.4% 84.3% 66.9% 66.9% 69.4% 74.9% 81.6%
Airbus 1,225 1,208 1,419 1,608 1,401 1,498 1,600 1,744 1,918
Airbus Helicopters 134 136 157 159 184 186 193 204 218
Airbus Defense & Space 627 521 540 654 350 367 382 400 424
Other / HQ / Consolidated 67 62 34 45 9 9 9 10 10
CAPEX in tangibles and intangibles (3,270) (2,918) (2,548) (2,924) (2,904) (3,079) (3,148) (3,150) (3,150)
CAPEX as % revenues 5.8% 5.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 4.0% 3.8%
Airbus (2,321) (2,116) (1,713) (2,001) (2,039) (2,230) (2,219) (2,219) (2,219)
Airbus Helicopters (323) (279) (303) (280) (263) (279) (296) (296) (296)
Airbus Defense and Space (657) (466) (497) (552) (563) (570) (634) (635) (635)
Other / HQ 31 (57) (35) (91) (40) 0 0 0 0
Table 5 - PP&E breakdown through base forecast D&A and Capital Expenditure as % of revenues forecast, Source 
Airbus company filings, Analyst assumption and research 
III. PP&E Breakdown 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Starting PP&E 14,974 15,585 16,321 17,127 18,088 19,106 20,070 20,861
[+] CAPEX 2,918 2,548 2,924 2,904 3,079 3,148 3,150 3,150
[-] Depreciation 2,053 1,927 2,150 1,957 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
Ending PP&E 14,974 15,585 16,321 17,127 18,088 19,106 20,070 20,861 21,440
Depreciation and amortization 1,927 2,150 2,466 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
Operating expenses Amortization/Imp. 419 485 452 452 452 452 452
Cost of sales 43 24 24 24 24 24 24
Depreciation 1,927 1,688 1,957 1,468 1,584 1,708 1,883 2,095




devices, Airbus CA owns most of the inventories which partly also reflect backlog and delays 
in delivery (if the inventories are stuck in the warehouses of Airbus). The share on the basis of 
which the business unit specific split was made is shown in orange. Trade payables and trade 
receivables were forecasted based on the divisions’ averaged contribution to revenues over 
time. CA covers 72% of receivables and payables, D&S 18% and Helicopters 10%.  
All other non-current assets and liabilities, not previously explained were projected to be 
constant over the next years. 
In order to value the two parts, we computed the unlevered free cash flows for both “parts” (see 
p. 26 on the sum-of-the-parts valuation for more details) and discounted them at the business 
unit’s specific WACC. For that purpose, we selected a small number of comparable companies 
and a market benchmark, the Euro STOXX 50 2, and regressed the company’s past 5 year 
weekly returns on the market returns. This provided us with the levered betas for our 
comparable companies. After unlevering the comparable company betas by using their 
company specific debt-to-equity ratio, we took the average of the betas and relevered it at the 
Airbus specific debt-to-equity ratio. Applying the CAPM asset pricing model, we were able to 
compute two industry specific costs of equity. These are based on the market risk premium of 
7.01% and the assumed risk free rate of 1% (based on the expected long-term policy rate of 
German 10-year Government Bunds) and the industry specific Airbus betas3. The cost of equity 
for DA/HQ is 7.46% and 6.47% for D&S/Helicopters. The company has 88% equity and 12% 
debt. Given that the units rely on group financing, we assumed that the debt-to-equity structure 
does not change between units, which would have been done ideally.  
                                                 
2 See Appendix 1 and 2 for the Euro STOXX 50 moving average and the index composition. 
3 The asset beta for Airbus CA was 1.013 and for D&S and Helicopters it was 0.852. The difference in the betas 
reflects the different levels of risks of each “part” compared to the market riskiness. For a detailed overview of the 
beta regression see Appendix 5. 
Table 6 – Forecasting operating working capital items and business unit breakdown, Sources: Analyst assumptions, Airbus 
company filings  
Inventories 22,201 24,023 25,355 29,051 33,481 33,438 33,341 35,350 37,488 % share
Airbus (Commercial Aircraft Jets) 18,871 20,420 21,552 24,693 28,459 28,422 28,340 30,047 31,865 85%
Airbus Helicopters 2,220 2,402 2,536 2,905 3,348 3,344 3,334 3,535 3,749 10%
Airbus Defense & Space 1,110 1,201 1,268 1,453 1,674 1,672 1,667 1,767 1,874 5%
Other / HQ / Consolidated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Trade receivables 6,183 6,628 6,798 7,877 7,640 7,990 8,484 8,995 9,539
Airbus (Commercial Aircraft Jets) 4,452 4,772 4,895 5,671 5,501 5,753 6,109 6,476 6,868 72%
Airbus Helicopters 587 630 646 748 726 759 806 855 906 10%
Airbus Defense & Space 1,113 1,193 1,224 1,418 1,375 1,438 1,527 1,619 1,717 18%
Other / HQ / Consolidated 31 33 34 39 38 40 42 45 48 1%
Trade liabilities 9,271 9,668 10,183 10,864 11,762 11,640 12,360 13,104 13,897
Airbus (Commercial Aircraft Jets) 6,675 6,961 7,332 7,822 8,469 8,381 8,899 9,435 10,006 72%
Airbus Helicopters 881 918 967 1,032 1,117 1,106 1,174 1,245 1,320 10%
Airbus Defense & Space 1,202 1,740 1,833 1,956 2,117 2,095 2,225 2,359 2,501 18%
Other / HQ / Consolidated 84 48 51 54 59 58 62 66 69 1%




The enterprise value of each part was determined by discounting the unlevered free cash flows 
back to today at the respective WACC4. 
Off-balance sheet operating leases were capitalized at the Group’s cost of debt (3.5%, based on 
historic financial statement information) and corrected for their tax effect, which arises from 
their debt-like nature (interest trigger tax shield). After summing both “part’s” respective 
enterprise values (EV), we obtain a total EV after capitalized leases of EUR 62.8bn for Airbus 
Group. We subtract financial debt net of cash, under-funded pension fund accounts and add 
back the minority interests in order to obtain the final equity value of Airbus Group which 
equals EUR 49.9bn.  
The target price is obtained by dividing the fair equity value by the total number of diluted 
shares outstanding (EUR 49.9bn / 772.71m). Our determined target price is EUR 64.52 (vs. 
actual market price of EUR 60.02) reflecting expected upsides.   
In the sensitivity analysis, we tested the EVs sensitivity to different WACCs and different 
terminal value growth rates. We observe that the EV is much more sensitive to changes in the 
WACC or TV growth rate within the Airbus Commercial Aerospace division cash flows than 
in the D&S/Helicopters “part”.   
Multiples valuation 
We conducted a multiple valuation based on 2016 year-to-date multiples. For the Commercial 
Aerospace industry, it was complicated to find true comparables to Airbus. Since the market 
has been so characterized by the Boeing-Airbus duopoly, hardly any company has a similar size 
and business model. In addition, the only companies that could have served as comparables 
were Comac, Bombardier and United Aircraft Corporation. However, here revenues from 
aircraft sale were either still minor compared to the overall company size, or the company was 
not publicly listed hence had no comparable market information and values. 
                                                 
4 The fully elaborated WACC computation with all steps and assumptions is set out in Appendix 6. 
Sum of parts EV after capitalized leases 62,798
[-] Net financial debt (6,369)
[-] Unfunded pension funds (6,567)
[+] Minority interests 8
Equity value Airbus Group 49,870
# shares outstanding 27-12-2016 772.71
Target share price 64.54
63,165 6.5% 7.0% 7.5% 8.0% 8.5%
1.5% 68,779 63,284 58,709 54,839 51,524
2.0% 75,155 68,557 63,165 58,674 54,876
2.5% 83,140 75,034 68,559 63,266 58,858
WACC Airbus CA
TV growth
63,165 5.5% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0% 7.5%
1.5% 65,986 64,330 63,044 62,017 61,176
2.0% 66,148 64,469 63,165 62,123 61,271
2.5% 66,310 64,607 63,285 62,229 61,366
WACC Airbus D&S/Helicopters
TV growth
Figure 17 – Enterprise Value and sensitivity analysis, Source: Analyst assumptions, Airbus company filings 




Regarding the Defence & Space and Helicopters business it was, however, much easier to find 
international companies. Nonetheless, the suitability to compare to the D&S and Helicopters 
division of Airbus is limited due to its size within Airbus Group as well as the comparably low 
global market share (expect for the commercial Helicopter business, where Airbus Helicopters 
is market leader). Nonetheless, we retrieved and computed relevant data for a set of multiples 
to value the divisions.  
 
Based on the 2016 revenues, which were derived from Q3 2016 financial reports and current 
trading information as of 27th December, we obtained a market derived valuation of the two 
businesses. For the CA division, we recommend using the EV/EBITDA multiple range, as 
depreciation and amortization expenses are very different between companies and the EV/EBIT 
multiples show that Airbus is entirely outperformed, even by Boeing. Price-to-earnings is not 
adequate due to different leverage level. The range for the EV/EBITDA multiple-based EV is 
EUR 36.3bn to EUR 73.1bn for Airbus CA, providing an average EV of EUR 50.1bn (compared 
to an EV of EUR 52.5bn for Airbus CA and HQ with DCF valuation). However, the result 
might be distorted due to the high Zodiac Aerospace EV/EBITDA multiple.  
For the valuation of the D&S unit and Airbus Helicopters, we will use the EV/EBIT, given that 
the financing structure and the business models are more comparable, and asset derived D&A 
play a smaller role. The average EV for the D&S/Helicopter multiple valuation range (EUR 
19.1bn to EUR 9.2bn), is EUR 14.1bn, compared to EUR 10.7bn.  
Based only on multiples averages the total EV of Airbus Group is EUR 64.3bn and the equity 
value is EUR 51.3bn, resulting in a target share price of EUR 66.39 (compared to EUR 65.01 





2016 YTD multiples 2016 YTD multiples
Commercial Aerospace EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E D&S / Helicopters EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E
Boeing Company 0.98x 13.89x 19.22x 23.40x Lockheed Martin 1.79x 13.23x 15.88x 18.63x
Embarer 0.68x 11.62x - 46.20x Textron 1.10x 9.42x 13.13x 16.87x
Zodiac Aerospace 1.53x 19.05x 29.55x 41.56x General Dynamics 1.42x 9.53x 10.61x 14.80x
Thales 1.23x 10.70x 15.05x 21.45x Rolls-Royce 1.01x 3.27x 7.64x 92.43x
Airbus 0.81x 11.52x 14.63x 18.62x Safran 1.07x 7.40x 11.94x -
Leonardo-Finmeccanico 1.61x 8.63x 11.39x 18.60x
Airbus 0.81x 11.52x 14.63x 18.62x
Max 1.53x 19.05x 29.55x 46.20x Max 1.79x 13.23x 15.88x 92.43x
Average 1.10x 13.82x 21.28x 33.15x Average 1.33x 8.58x 11.77x 32.27x
Median 1.10x 12.76x 19.22x 32.48x Median 1.26x 9.02x 11.67x 18.60x
Min 0.68x 10.70x 15.05x 21.45x Min 1.01x 3.27x 7.64x 14.80x
Table 7 – Multiples of comparable companies in Commercial Aerospace and Defence and Space, Source: Bloomberg 






































Income Statement in EUR mn 2012A 2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
Revenues 56,480 57,567 60,713 64,450 65,682 69,662 73,968 78,423 83,167
YoY % growth 15.0% 1.9% 5.5% 6.2% 2.0% 6.1% 6.2% 6.0% 6.0%
Airbus Commercial Aerospace 36,999 38,561 41,531 45,090 47,345 50,659 54,205 57,999 62,059
% of revenues 65.5% 67.0% 68.4% 70.0% 72.1% 72.7% 73.3% 74.0% 74.6%
Airbus Helicopters 5,724 5,811 5,996 6,153 6,215 6,277 6,528 6,789 7,060
% of revenues 10.1% 10.1% 9.9% 9.5% 9.5% 9.0% 8.8% 8.7% 8.5%
Airbus Defence & Space 13,154 12,739 12,728 12,917 11,833 12,425 12,922 13,309 13,709
% of revenues 23.3% 22.1% 21.0% 20.0% 18.0% 17.8% 17.5% 17.0% 16.5%
Other / HQ / Consolidated 603 456 458 290 290 302 314 326 339
% of revenues 1.1% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Costs of Goods Sold (48,582) (49,613) (51,776) (55,599) (56,487) (59,700) (63,390) (67,209) (71,274)
% of revenues 86.0% 86.2% 85.3% 86.3% 86.0% 85.7% 85.7% 85.7% 85.7%
Airbus Commercial Aerospace (31,825) (33,233) (35,418) (38,898) (40,716) (43,414) (46,453) (49,705) (53,185)
Airbus Helicopters (4,924) (5,008) (5,113) (5,308) (5,344) (5,379) (5,594) (5,818) (6,051)
Airbus Defense & Space (11,315) (10,979) (10,854) (11,143) (10,176) (10,648) (11,074) (11,406) (11,748)
Other / HQ / Consolidated (519) (393) (391) (250) (249) (258) (269) (280) (291)
Gross Margin 7,898 7,954 8,937 8,851 9,195 9,962 10,577 11,215 11,893
% of revenues 14.0% 13.8% 14.7% 13.7% 14.0% 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 14.3%
Operating expenses (6,029) (5,880) (5,992) (6,111) (6,203) (6,579) (6,985) (7,406) (7,854)
Operating expenses excl. R&D expenses (2,869) (2,762) (2,601) (2,651) (2,596) (2,753) (2,924) (3,100) (3,287)
Airbus Commercial Aerospace (1,879) (1,850) (1,779) (1,855) (1,871) (2,002) (2,142) (2,292) (2,453)
Airbus Helicopters (291) (279) (257) (253) (246) (248) (258) (268) (279)
Airbus Defense & Space (668) (611) (545) (531) (468) (491) (511) (526) (542)
Other / HQ / Consolidated (31) (22) (20) (12) (11) (12) (12) (13) (13)
Selling expenses (1,192) (1,140) (1,063) (1,065) (1,085) (1,151) (1,222) (1,296) (1,374)
% of revenues 2.1% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Administrative expenses (1,677) (1,622) (1,538) (1,586) (1,511) (1,602) (1,701) (1,804) (1,913)
% of revenues 3.0% 2.8% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
R&D expenses (3,160) (3,118) (3,391) (3,460) (3,607) (3,825) (4,062) (4,306) (4,567)
% of revenues 5.6% 5.4% 5.6% 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%
Airbus Commercial Aerospace (2,438) (2,433) (2,667) (2,702) (2,813) (2,983) (3,167) (3,358) (3,561)
Airbus Helicopters (306) (306) (325) (325) (347) (368) (391) (414) (439)
Airbus Defense & Space (381) (344) (360) (344) (394) (418) (444) (470) (499)
Other / HQ / Consolidated (35) (35) (39) (89) (53) (57) (60) (64) (68)
Share invest. profits under equity method 241 434 840 1,016 633 633 633 633 633
Reported EBITDA 4,163 4,435 5,935 6,222 5,569 6,076 6,409 6,800 7,243
EBITDA margin 7.4% 7.7% 9.8% 9.7% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7%
One-off transactions 376 558 64 265 0 0 0 0 0
Normalized EBITDA 4,539 4,993 5,999 6,487 5,569 6,076 6,409 6,800 7,243
EBITDA margin adj. 8.0% 8.7% 9.9% 10.1% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7%
Depreciation 2,053 1,927 2,150 2,466 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
EBIT 2,486 3,066 3,849 4,021 3,625 4,016 4,225 4,441 4,672
% of revenues 4.4% 5.3% 6.3% 6.2% 5.5% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.6%
Airbus Commercial Aerospace 1,183 1,662 1,682 1,765 2,019 2,334 2,517 2,718 2,935
Airbus Helicopters 207 339 477 426 392 396 399 403 406
Airbus Defense & Space 879 808 1,516 1,193 808 881 906 920 932
Other / HQ / Consolidated 217 257 174 638 406 405 403 400 398
Interest income 237 161 142 183 142 107 107 107 107
Interest expense (522) (493) (462) (551) (684) (848) (848) (848) (848)
Other financial result (168) (278) (458) (319) (306) (306) (306) (306) (306)
EBT 2,033 2,456 3,071 3,334 2,778 2,968 3,177 3,394 3,624
Income taxes (438) (477) (863) (800) (667) (712) (763) (814) (870)
Net income 1,595 1,979 2,208 2,534 2,111 2,256 2,415 2,579 2,754
Equity owners of the parent 1,197 1,473 2,343 2,696 2,113 2,258 2,417 2,581 2,756
Non-controlling interests 1 10 7 2 2 2 2 2 2
Effective tax rate 21.5% 19.4% 28.1% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0%
Dividend (369) (467) (587) (945) (584) (624) (668) (713) (762)
Payout Ratio 23.1% 23.6% 26.6% 37.3% 27.7% 27.7% 27.7% 27.7% 27.7%
Dividend income from investments 6 49 55 54
Other non-operating income income 184 272 330 474
Other expenses (229) (259) (179) (222)
Total gain/loss from non-operating act. (39) 62 206 306






































BALANCE SHEET in mio € 2012A 2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
Non-current assets 46,005 45,526 48,420 53,438 56,515 58,165 59,763 61,186 62,398
Intangible assets 12,271 12,500 12,758 12,555 12,555 12,555 12,555 12,555 12,555
PP&E 14,974 15,654 16,388 17,193 18,154 19,172 20,136 20,927 21,506
Strategic investments 3,584 3,858 3,391 1,326 1,794 2,427 3,060 3,692 4,325
Other investments & LT financial assets 1,965 1,756 1,769 2,492 3,515 3,515 3,515 3,515 3,515
Non-current other financial assets 1,386 2,076 586 1,096 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114
Non-current other assets 1,413 1,651 1,822 2,166 2,273 2,273 2,273 2,273 2,273
Deferred tax assets 4,425 3,733 5,717 6,759 7,450 7,450 7,450 7,450 7,450
Non-current securities 5,987 4,298 5,989 9,851 9,660 9,660 9,660 9,660 9,660
Current assets 42,985 44,748 46,932 50,565 53,162 51,856 55,809 59,636 64,573
Inventories 22,201 24,023 25,355 29,051 33,481 33,438 33,341 35,350 37,488
Airbus Commercial Aerospace 18,871 20,420 21,552 24,693 28,459 28,422 28,340 30,047 31,865
Airbus Helicopters 2,220 2,402 2,536 2,905 3,348 3,344 3,334 3,535 3,749
Airbus Defense & Space 1,110 1,201 1,268 1,453 1,674 1,672 1,667 1,767 1,874
Other / HQ / Consolidated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade receivables 6,183 6,628 6,798 7,877 7,640 7,990 8,484 8,995 9,539
Airbus Commercial Aerospace 4,452 4,772 4,895 5,671 5,501 5,753 6,109 6,476 6,868
Airbus Helicopters 587 630 646 748 726 759 806 855 906
Airbus Defense & Space 1,113 1,193 1,224 1,418 1,375 1,438 1,527 1,619 1,717
Other / HQ / Consolidated 31 33 34 39 38 40 42 45 48
Current portion of other LT financial assets 271 132 167 178 648 648 648 648 648
Current other financial assets 1,444 1,591 1,164 1,402 1,094 1,094 1,094 1,094 1,094
Current other assets 1,934 1,960 2,389 2,819 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930
Current tax assets 450 628 605 860 901 901 901 901 901
Current securities 2,331 2,585 3,183 1,788 1,518 1,518 1,518 1,518 1,518
Cash and cash equivalents 8,171 7,201 7,271 6,590 4,950 3,337 6,892 8,200 10,455
Assets and disposals classified as held for sale 750 1,779 1,197 1,197 1,197 1,197 1,197
Total assets 88,990 90,274 96,102 105,782 110,873 111,218 116,768 122,019 128,168
Equity  to equity owners of parent 10,260 10,864 7,061 5,966 7,493 9,125 10,872 12,738 14,731
Capital stock 827 783 785 785 785 785 785 785 785
Share premium 7,253 5,049 4,500 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484
Retained Earnings 753 2,167 2,989 6,316 7,843 9,475 11,222 13,088 15,081
Accumulated other comprehensive income 1,511 2,915 (1,205) (4,316) (4,316) (4,316) (4,316) (4,316) (4,316)
Treasury shares (84) (50) (8) (303) (303) (303) (303) (303) (303)
Non-controlling interests 16 42 18 7 8 8 8 8 8
Total equity 10,276 10,906 7,079 5,973 7,501 9,133 10,880 12,746 14,739
Non-current liabilities 32,343 33,017 40,846 46,700 47,777 46,775 47,684 48,076 49,045
Non-current provisions 9,411 9,604 10,400 9,871 10,139 10,139 10,139 10,139 10,139
Long-term financing liabilities 3,312 3,804 6,278 6,335 8,825 8,825 8,825 8,825 8,825
Non-current other financial liabilities 7,454 7,154 9,922 14,038 11,077 11,077 11,077 11,077 11,077
Non-current other liabilities 10,496 10,764 12,849 14,993 15,721 14,719 15,628 16,020 16,989
Deferred tax liabilities 1,459 1,454 1,130 1,200 1,802 1,802 1,802 1,802 1,802
Non-current deferred income 211 237 267 263 213 213 213 213 213
Current liabilities 46,371 46,351 47,497 52,878 54,649 54,364 57,258 60,251 63,439
Current provisions 5,940 5,222 5,712 5,209 5,066 5,066 5,066 5,066 5,066
Short-term financing liabilities 1,463 1,826 1,073 2,790 2,494 2,494 2,494 2,494 2,494
Trade liabilities 9,271 9,668 10,183 10,864 11,762 11,640 12,360 13,104 13,897
Airbus Commercial Aerospace 6,675 6,961 7,332 7,822 8,469 8,381 8,899 9,435 10,006
Airbus Helicopters 881 918 967 1,032 1,117 1,106 1,174 1,245 1,320
Airbus Defense & Space 1,202 1,740 1,833 1,956 2,117 2,095 2,225 2,359 2,501
Other / HQ / Consolidated 84 48 51 54 59 58 62 66 69
Current other liabilities 29,697 29,635 30,529 34,015 35,327 35,164 37,338 39,587 41,982
Liabilities classified as held for sale 0 0 680 231 946 946 946 946 946
Total liabilities 78,714 79,368 89,023 99,809 103,372 102,085 105,888 109,273 113,429
Total equity and liabilities 88,990 90,274 96,102 105,782 110,873 111,218 116,768 122,019 128,168






































I. Pension Plans 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Pension Funded Status
Fair Value of Plan Assets 6,588 6,473 7,395 6,972 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857
Defined Benefit Obligation 12,612 12,282 14,962 13,839 13,424 13,424 13,424 13,424 13,424
Under-Funded Pension Plans -6,024 -5,809 -7,567 -6,867 -6,567 -6,567 -6,567 -6,567 -6,567
II. Operating leases 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Operating Leases (Rental Expense) Schedule
  Rental Expense - Year 1 69 84 69 62 62 62 62 62 62
  Rental Expense - Years 2 - 5 219 174 142 98 98 98 98 98 98
  Rental Expense Beyond Year 5 44 13 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Future Min Oper Lease Obligations 332 271 213 160 160 160 160 160 160
III. PP&E Breakdown 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Starting PP&E 14,974 15,585 16,321 17,127 18,088 19,106 20,070 20,861
[+] CAPEX 2,918 2,548 2,924 2,904 3,079 3,148 3,150 3,150
[-] Depreciation 2,053 1,927 2,150 1,957 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
Ending PP&E 14,974 15,585 16,321 17,127 18,088 19,106 20,070 20,861 21,440
Depreciation and amortization 1,927 2,150 2,466 1,944 2,060 2,184 2,359 2,571
Operating expenses Amortization / Impairment 419 485 452 452 452 452 452
Cost of sales 43 24 24 24 24 24 24
Depreciation 1,927 1,688 1,957 1,468 1,584 1,708 1,883 2,095
IV. Working Capital Ratios 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Days of Sales Outstanding (DSO) 40.0 42.0 40.9 44.6 42.5 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9
Inventory Turnover 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9
Days of Payables Outstanding (DPO) 69.7 71.1 71.8 71.3 76.0 71.2 71.2 71.2 71.2
V. Debt/Equity Ratios
Total debt (ST + LT) 6,369
Total equity (BV) 5,966 31.12.15 27.12.16
Total equity (MV) 46,410 # shares outstanding 773.85 772.71
D/E 0.14 current market share price 59.97 60.06
D/EV 0.12
E/EV 0.88
VI. Returns/operating performance metrics 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Returns
ROIC 12.5% 15.9% 15.1% 10.3% 9.9% 9.6% 9.3% 9.0%
ROA 2.2% 2.4% 2.5% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2%
ROE 18.7% 24.6% 38.8% 31.3% 27.1% 24.1% 21.8% 20.0%
ROCE 7.0% 7.9% 7.6% 6.4% 7.1% 7.1% 7.2% 7.2%
Operating performance
Capex/Sales 5.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 4.0% 3.8%
R&D/Sales 5.4% 5.6% 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%
D&A/Sales 3.3% 3.5% 3.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.1%
Capex/D&A 1.51 1.19 1.19 1.49 1.49 1.44 1.34 1.23




Sum-of-the-parts DCF valuation 
 
Airbus Commercial Aerospace
Forecasting period / future FCF
2012A 2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F TV
EBIT 1,400 1,919 1,856 2,402 2,425 2,739 2,919 3,119 3,333 3,400
[+] Non-deductible GW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBITA 1,400 1,919 1,856 2,402 2,425 2,739 2,919 3,119 3,333 3,400
[-] Tax (MTR) 336 461 445 577 582 657 701 748 800 816
NOPLAT 1,064 1,458 1,411 1,826 1,843 2,082 2,219 2,370 2,533 2,584
[+] Depreciation/Amortization 1,292 1,270 1,453 1,653 1,410 1,507 1,610 1,754 1,929 1,967
Dec / (inc) in OWC (1,621) (882) (3,430) (2,943) (305) 246 (1,538) (1,637) (1,670)
[+] Δ Trade receivables (323) (123) (782) 172 (254) (358) (371) (394) (402)
[+] Δ Inventories (1,549) (1,132) (3,142) (3,766) 37 82 (1,707) (1,818) (1,854)
[-] Δ Trade payables 251 373 494 651 (88) 522 540 575 586
[+] Δ Advance payments 353 737 3,959 2,139 (6) 2,730 2,275 2,974 1,781
Δ Current and non-current provisions (525) 1,286 (1,032) 125 0 0 0 0 0
Δ Other current assets (440) (183) 891 67 0 0 0 0 0
Δ Other current liabilities (147) 2,242 1,671 (99) (1,159) 354 366 389 397
[-] Capital Expenditure (2,173) (1,748) (2,092) (2,079) (2,230) (2,219) (2,219) (2,219) (2,007)
Free Cash Flows to the Firm (1,824) 4,315 3,446 463 (111) 4,938 3,008 3,969 3,053
Free Cash Flow after tax 463 (111) 4,938 3,008 3,969 3,053
Operating Leases 144 144 144 144 144 144
Tax effect leases 26 26 26 26 27 27
Operating leases after tax 118 118 118 118 117 117
Free Cash Flow after tax, lease adj. 581 7 5,056 3,125 4,086 3,170
Periods 0.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 4.25
Airbus Commercial Aircraft WACC 7.46% 7.46% 7.46% 7.46% 7.46% 7.46% 7.46%
TV growth rate 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
Discount factor 0.98 0.91 0.85 0.79 0.74 13.48
Discounted FCF after tax, lease adj. 570 7 4,300 2,474 3,010 42,743
Leasing discount rate 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
Discount factor 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.86
Capitalized operating leases after tax 117 113 109 105 101 101
EV before capitalized leases 53,104
Capitalized leases (647)
EV after capitalized leases 52,457
Airbus D&S/Helicopters
Forecasting period / future FCF
2012a 2013a 2014a 2015a 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f TV
EBIT 1,086 1,147 1,993 1,619 1,200 1,277 1,306 1,323 1,339 1,365
[+] Non-deductible GW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBITA 1,086 1,147 1,993 1,619 1,200 1,277 1,306 1,323 1,339 1,365
[-] Tax (MTR) 261 275 478 388 288 306 313 317 321 328
NOPLAT 825 872 1,515 1,230 912 970 992 1,005 1,017 1,038
[+] Depreciation/Amortization 761 657 697 813 534 553 574 604 642 655
Dec / (inc) in OWC 181 (105) (664) (352) (123) 77 (237) (252) (257)
[+] Δ Trade receivables (122) (47) (297) 65 (96) (136) (141) (150) (153)
[+] Δ Inventories (273) (200) (554) (665) 7 14 (301) (321) (327)
[-] Δ Trade payables 576 142 187 247 (34) 198 205 218 222
[-] Capital Expenditure (745) (800) (832) (825) (849) (929) (931) (931) (949)
Free Cash Flows to the Firm 965 1,307 547 268 551 714 442 476 486
Free Cash Flow after tax 268 551 714 442 476 486
Operating Leases 16 16 16 16 16 16
Tax effect leases 3 3 3 3 3 0
Operating leases after tax 13 13 13 13 13 16
Free Cash Flow after tax, lease adj. 282 565 727 455 489 502
Periods 0.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 4.25
D&S/Helicopters WACC 6.47% 6.47% 6.47% 6.47% 6.47% 6.47% 6.47%
TV growth rate 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
Discount factor 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.77 17.15
Discounted FCF after tax, lease adj. 277 522 631 371 375 8,606
Leasing discount rate 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
Discount factor 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.86
Capitalized operating leases after tax 13 13 12 12 11 14
EV before capitalized leases 10,782
Capitalized leases (74)
EV after capitalized leases 10,708
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